Group Behavior in Business

The Logic of Group Behavior In Business and Elsewhere
Men journey together with a view to particular advantage and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the purpose of life, and similarly the political association seems to have come together originally. . . for the sake of the general advantage it brings.
Aristotle1
Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion, . . .rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest. In other words, even if all. . . would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest.
Mancur Olson2
n earlier chapters, we introduced the usefulness of markets. However, as is evident
inside firms, not all human interactions are through “markets.” People often act
cooperatively in groups or, as the case may be, in “firms.” In this chapter our central purpose is to explore how and under what conditions people can organize their behavior into voluntary cooperative associations (groups and firms) in which all work together for the attainment of some common objective, say, greater environmental cleanliness, the development of a “club atmosphere,” or the maximization of firm profits. The focus of our attention is on the viability of groups like families, cliques, communes, clubs, unions, and professional associations and societies, as well as firms, in which individual participation is voluntary to cohere and pursue the common interests of the members.
We consider two dominant and conflicting theories of group behavior. They are “the common interest theory” and “the economic theory” of group behavior. The former is based on the proposition that a group is an organic whole” identified by the “common interest” shared by its individual members. Its basic thesis is that all groups, even very large ones, are organized to pursue the common interest of the group members. Taking this theory one step further, it implies that if people share a common interest, they will organize themselves into a group and voluntarily pursue their shared interest.
According to the economic theory of group behavior, the group is a collection of independently motivated individuals who organize voluntarily to pursue their common interest only in small groups, like families or clubs. In large groups the common interest
1 Aristotle, Ethics, vol. 8, no. 9, p. 1160a. 2 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 2
is very often ineffective in motivating group behavior. The logic of this theory seems perverse; but, as we will see in later chapters, it is the basis for almost all economic discussion of markets and explains why many policy proponents argue governments must be delegated coercive powers to collect taxes and to pursue the “public interest.” It also helps explain why firms are organized the way they are and why managers manage the way they do. This is, therefore, one of the pivotal chapters in this book.
However, keep in mind that groups are not the only means by which people’s interpersonal or social behavior is organized in society. Economics is basically a study of comparative social systems, an examination of how the different ways of organizing interpersonal behavior can be fitted together in different combinations. We call these means of organizing people’s behavior “social organizers” and mention four of them here: markets which involve exchanges of goods and services, government coercion, violence, and voluntary groups. On the surface, violence may not appear to be a bona fide alternative, but we are forced to mention it because of the use made of it throughout the world. The behavior of street-gang members, for example, with respect to people totally unassociated with them, is largely based upon either the existence or the threat of violence. The Cold War was a tenuous truce founded to a sizable degree on the threat of a nuclear holocaust. The persistent violence in the streets of Northern Ireland during the 1960s and 1970s will for many years have a profound influence on what the people of that country can hope to accomplish. Many examples can be cited which illustrate the spread of terrorist activities and the threat they represent to the fabric of social order which has been built on the basis of other social organizers. Aside from what we have already said with regard to anarchy, we will have little to say about violence as a social organizer. This does not lessen the importance, which we attribute to violence; it simply reflects the fact that economists have only recently turned their attention to the subject and much remains to be done in the way of theory construction.3
The question of how you appraise the roles the various social organizers should play in social order appears to be wrapped in one’s personal ideology or value system—that is, there appears to be no room for positive analysis. Indeed, what we as individuals want the system to accomplish is surely a factor in how each of us evaluates potential social organizers. Personal values will affect our attitude as to whether or not a given social organizer should be used and, if used, how extensively. The avowed Marxist has very harsh opinions of the market system. But perhaps just as important in our appraisal is what we know about the relative effectiveness—the advantages and limitations—of the potential means for ordering behavior. If, for example, we have only a rudimentary understanding of how the market works and fail to appreciate with sufficient clarity the limitations of cooperative efforts, we may naturally place greater reliance on voluntary
3 For example of economists’ initial probes into the area of malevolence and violence, see Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economy of Love and Fear (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), and Gordon Tullock, The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution (Blacksburg, Va.: University Publications, 1974). Only those who wish to be challenged will find these books useful.
cooperation than we would otherwise. We, therefore, in this chapter highlight the limitations of voluntary groups as a social organizer in order that we may appreciate why markets are not only beneficial but also necessary in organizing a society of heterogeneous individuals.
Common Interest Theory of Group Behavior
There are almost as many theories of group behavior as there are group theorists. However, categorizing theories according to dominant themes or characteristics is sensible in light of our limited space.
All theories of group behavior begin by recognizing the multiplicity of forces, which affect group members and, therefore, groups. This is especially true of what we term the common interest theory. Many present-day sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists generally share this point of view, which has been prominent at least since Aristotle. The determinants of group behavior most often singled out are the “leadership quality” of specific group members and the need felt among group members for “affiliation,” “security,” “recognition,” “social status,” or money. Groups like clubs or unions form so that members can achieve or satisfy a want that they could not satisfy as efficiently through individual action. All these considerations are instrumental in affecting “group cohesion,” which, in turn, affects the “strength” of the group and its ability to compete with other groups for the same objectives. From the perspective of this theory, when people join firms, they accept the firm’s objective and pursue it because everyone else wants the same thing, leading to self-enforcing group cohesion.
The common interest theory views the “group” as an organic whole, much like an individual, as opposed to a collection of individuals whose separate actions appear to be “group action.” According to the theory, the group has a life of its own which is to a degree independent of the individuals who comprise it. Herbert Spencer, a nineteenth-century sociologist, often described the group as a “social organism” or as a “superorganic” entity.4 Karl Marx wrote of the “class struggle” which will bring down “bourgeois capitalism” and of the proletariat” which will, in its place, erect the communist society. And it was probably the social-organism view of groups that Aristotle had in mind when he wrote, “Man is by nature a political animal.”5
Two major reasons are given for viewing groups as a social organism. First, a group consists of a mass of interdependencies, which connect the individuals in the group. Without the interdependencies, there would be only isolated individuals, and the term group would have no meaning. Individuals are like the nodes of a spider web. The
4 Spencer was actually somewhat ambivalent on the subject; at times he also wrote of groups as a composite of individuals. This aspect of his writing reflected the influence David Hume and Adam Smith had on his thinking. See Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1896). 5 Aristotle, Politics, Book II.
spider web is constructed on these nodes, and the movements in one part of the web can be transmitted to all other parts. Much like the process of synergism in biology,6 the actions of individuals within a group combine to form a force that is greater than the sum of the forces generated by individuals isolated from one another. The group must, so the argument goes, be thought of as more than the sum total of individuals. This argument is often used to arouse support for a labor union. Union leaders argue that the union can get higher wage increases for all workers can obtain acting independently of one another. The reason is that union leaders efficiently coordinate the efforts of all. Environmental groups make essentially the same argument: With well-placed lobbyists, the environmental group can have a greater political impact than can all the individuals they represent writing independent letters to their representatives at different times.
Second, groups tend to emerge because they satisfy some interest shared by all the group’s members. Because all share this “common interest,” individuals have an incentive to work with others to pursue that interest, sharing the costs as they work together. Aristotle wrote, “Men journey together with a view to particular advantage,”7 and Arthur Bentley said, “There is no group without its interest.. . .The group and the interest are not separate. . . . If we try to take the group without the interest, we simply have nothing at all.”8
Having observed that a common interest can be shared by all of a group’s member, the adherents of this theory of group behavior argue that a group can with slight modification, be treated as an individual. The primary modification is the relative tightness or looseness of the ties that bind the group members together. This usually makes group action and reaction less decisive and precise than that of individuals, but the difference between a group and an individual is still a matter of degree, not kind. For instance, the difficulty of passing information about group goals from person to person can make the group’s response to new information somewhat sluggish. Nevertheless, a group can be assumed to maximize the attainment of its common objective. Furthermore, the implicit assumption is made that this will be true of large as well as small groups. It is on this deduction that Mancur Olson and many economists take issue with this analysis of group behavior.
The Economic Theory of Group Behavior
Mancur Olson, on whose work this section rests, agrees that the “common interest” can be influential and is very important in motivating the behavior of members of small groups. However, he, like so many other economists, insists that a group must be looked upon as a composite of individuals as opposed to an anthropomorphic whole, that the common interest, which can be so effective in motivating members of small groups, can be impotent in motivating members of large groups: “Unless there is coercion in large
6 This is the process whereby two or more substances (gases or pollutants) come together, and combined can have a greater effect than the sum of the effects of each individual taken separately.7 Aristotle, Ethics, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 1160a. 8 Bentley, in Peter Odegard (ed.) Process of Government (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 211-213.
groups. . . ., rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest.” Furthermore, he contends, “These points hold true when there is unanimous agreement in a group about the common goal and the methods of achieving it.”9 To understand this theory, we will first examine the propositions upon which it is founded and then analyze some qualifications.
Basic Propositions
Using economic analysis, people are assumed to be as rational in their decision to join a group as they are toward doing anything else; they will join a group if the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs they must bear. As explained earlier, these costs and benefits, like all others relevant to any other act, must be discounted by the probability that the costs and benefits will be realized.10 There are several direct, private benefits to belonging to groups, such as companionship, security, recognition, and social status. A person may also belong to a group for no other reason than to receive mail from it and, in that small way, to feel important. A group may serve as an outlet for our altruistic or charitable feelings. If by “common interest” we mean a collection of these types of private benefits, it is easy to see how they can motivate group behavior. Entrepreneurs can emerge to “sell” these types of private benefits as they do in the case of private golf clubs or Weight-watchers. The group action will be then, essentially, a market phenomenon—that is, a problem in simple exchange.
However, the central concern of this theory is a “common interest” which is separate and detached from these types of private benefits. The concern is with public benefits that transcend the entire group, which cannot be provided by the market, and which may be obtained only by some form of collective action. That is, a group of people must band together to change things from what they otherwise would be. Examples include the common interest of consumers in general to obtain better, safer products than the market would provide without collective action; the interest of labor unions is to secure higher wages and better fringe benefits than could be obtained by the independent actions of laborers; the interest of students is to have better instruction; the interest of faculties is to educate quality graduates. These are examples of the common interest being a public good. (As you will recall, a public good was defined as a good— or service—the benefits of which are shared by all members of the relevant group if the good is provided or consumed by anyone.)
9 Olson, Logic of Collective Action, p. 2. A number of economists were moving toward the development of Olson’s line of analysis, but the force and clarity of Olson’s presentation of his view of group behavior make his book an important reference work.10 This type of cost and benefit analysis has been explicit, if not implicit, in much of the writing of those in support of the “common interest theory of groups” explained above. There would be little reason for talking about a “common interest” if it did not have something to do with benefits of group participation. See, for example, Dorwin Cartwright, “The Nature of Group Cohesiveness,” in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 91-109.
Small Groups
Small groups are not without their problems in pursuing the “common interest” of their members. They have a problem of becoming organized, holding together, and ensuring that everyone contributes his part to the group’s common interest. This point was illustrated earlier in terms of Fred and Harry’s problems of setting up a social contract, and it can be understood in terms of all those little things which we can do with friends and neighbors but which will go undone because of the problems associated with having two or three people come together for the “common good.” For example, it may be in the common interest of three neighbors for all to rid their yards of dandelions. If one person does it, and the other two do not, the person who removes the dandelions may find his yard full of them the next year because of seeds doing from the other two yards. Why do we so often find such a small number of neighbors failing to join together to do something like eradicating dandelions?
We can address this question with the use of the public goods demand curve developed earlier. The common interest is dandelion eradication; and two neighbors, Fred and Harry, again, have a demand for this public good.11 There is no particular reason for us to assume that Fred and Harry have identical demands for this particular public good; consequently, we have drawn Harry’s demand for eliminating dandelions in Figure
5.1 greater than Fred’s demand.
Figure 5.1 The Problem of Getting Collective Action
If the marginal cost curve is MC2, the marginal cost of eliminating even the first dandelion will be too high to take any action at dandelion eradication. However, if the cost were lower, MC1 instead of MC2, Harry would be willing to eliminate as many as Q1 dandelions. Fred would still do nothing.

11 We realize the imperfections of this example of a public good; much of the benefit of each person’s action is private. Only a portion of one neighbor’s dandelions may actually affect other people’s yards. The example, however, is a reasonably good one for our purpose.
If we assume, for simplicity only, that the marginal cost of eliminating dandelions is constant, the marginal cost curve will be horizontal. Whether or not either Fred or Harry will individually do anything about his dandelions depends, given their demands, upon the position of the marginal cost curve. If, for example, it is positioned as MC2 in Figure 5.1, neither Fred nor Harry will be motivated individually to do any thing about the problem. The marginal cost of eliminating the first dandelion is greater than the benefits that even Harry, who has the greater demand, received from it. Notice that the marginal cost curve (MC2) does not intersect either of the demand curves in the graph, meaning that the optimum level of activity for both, on an individual basis, is zero. On the other hand, if the marginal cost curve is at MC1, Fred will still be unwilling to do anything, but Harry will be willing to eliminate, on his own, up to Q1 dandelions. Fred, however, will benefit from Harry’s actions; he will have fewer dandelions in his own yard; he can “free-ride” because of Harry’s high demand for dandelion eradication.
Still, the quantity of dandelions eradicated may not be what is socially optimal. Consider Figure 5.2. In that figure we have constructed Fred and Harry’s joint, or public good, demand curve. Their collective demand curve is obtained by vertically summing the demands of the individuals. Under individual action, Q1 dandelions are eradicated by Harry. However, the value which Fred and Harry collectively place on the elimination of additional dandelions is greater than the marginal cost. For example, the marginal value of the Q1th unit to both Fred and Harry combined is MB1; the marginal cost, MC1. They can gain by eliminating that dandelion and all others up to Q3. This is the point where the marginal cost curve and the public good demand curve intersect. By sharing the cost of eliminating the weeds, they can move to Q3. Harry will not move to that point if he has to pay the full cost for each unit, MC1, but he will move beyond Q1 if he can get Fred to take over part of the cost. How they share the cost must, because of the complications involved, be reserved for a later discussion; we need only point out here that there is no reason to believe that an equal sharing of the cost will be the outcome.
Figure 5.2 Efficient Provision of Collective Goods
The public goods demand curve, which is the darker curve in the figure, is derived by vertically adding the demands of Fred and Harry. Given a marginal cost represented by MC1, the optimum quantity of dandelions removed is Q3.

Even though Fred and Harry may not ever agree to work out their common problem (or interest) cooperatively, there are several conditions that may lead them to do so. In a small group there is personal contact. Everyone knows everyone else. What benefits or costs there may be from an individual’s action are spread over just a few people and, therefore, the effect felt by any one person can be significant. (Fred knows there is a reasonably high probability that what he does to eliminate dandelions from the border of his property affects Harry’s welfare.) If the individual providing the public good is concerned about the welfare of those within his group and receives personal satisfaction from knowing that he has in some way helped them, he has an incentive to contribute to the common good; and we emphasize that before the common good can be realized, individuals must have some motivation for contributing toward it. Furthermore, “free-riders” are easily detected in a small group. (Harry can tell with relative ease when Fred is not working on, or has not worked on, the dandelions in his yard.) If one person tries to let the others shoulder his share, the absence of his contribution will probably be detected. Others can then bring social pressure to bear to force him to live up to his end of the bargain. The enforcement costs are low because the group is small. There are many ways to let a neighbor know you are displeased with some aspect of his behavior.
Finally, in small groups an individual shirking responsibilities can be excluded from the group if he does not contribute to the common interest and joins the group merely to free ride on the efforts of others. In larger groups, like nations, exclusion is more difficult and, therefore, more unlikely.
The problem of organizing “group behavior” to serve the common interest has been a problem for almost all groups, even the utopian communities that sprang up during the nineteenth century and in the 1960s. Rosebeth Kanter, in her study of successful nineteenth-century utopian communities concluded:
The primary issue with which a utopian community must cope in order to have the strength and solidarity to endure is its human organization: how people arrange to do the work that the community needs to survive as a group, and how the group in turn manages to satisfy and involve its members over a long period of time. The idealized version of communal life must be meshed with the reality of the work to be done in the community, involving difficult problems of social organization. In utopia, for instance, who takes out the garbage?12
Kanter found that the most successful communities minimized the free-rider problems by restricting entry into the community. They restricted entry by requiring potential members to make commitments to the group. A six “commitment mechanism” distinguished the successful from the unsuccessful utopias: (1) sacrifice of habits common to the outside world, such as abstinence from alcohol and tobacco or, in some cases, celibacy; (2) assignment of all worldly goods to the community; (3) adoption of rules which would minimize the disruptive effects of relationships between members and
12 Rosebeth M. Kanter, Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 64.
nonmembers and which would (through, for example, the wearing of uniforms) distinguish members from nonmembers; (4) collective sharing of all property and all communal work; (5) submission to public confession and criticism; and (6) expressed commitment to an identifiable power structure and tradition. Needless to say, the cost implied in these “commitment mechanisms” would tend to discourage many free riders from joining the society. By identifying the boundaries to societies, these mechanisms made exclusion possible. As Kanter points out, the importance of these commitment mechanisms is illustrated by the fact that their breakdown foreshadowed the end of the community.
Other means of bringing about collective behavior on the part of group members are suggested by the cattlemen’s associations formed during the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth century, cattle were allowed to run free over the ranges of the West. The cattlemen had a common interest in ensuring that the ranges were not overstocked and overgrazed and in securing cooperation in rounding up the cattle. To provide for these common interests, cattlemen formed associations which sent out patrols to keep out intruders and which were responsible for the roundups. Any cattleman who failed to contribute his share toward these ends could be excluded from the association, which generally meant that his cattle were excluded from the roundup or were confiscated by the association if they were rounded up.13
The family is a small group, which by its very nature is designed to promote the common interest of its members. That common interest may be something called “a happy family life,” which is, admittedly, difficult to define. The family does not escape difficulties. At present its validity as a viable institution is being challenged by many sources; however, it does have several redeeming features that we think will cause it to endure, imperfect though it may be, as a basic component of social fabric. Because of the smallness of the group, contributions made toward the common interest of the family can be shared and appreciated directly. Parents usually know when their children are failing to take the interest of the family into account, and children can easily ascertain similar behavior in their parents. Family members are able, at least in most cases, to know personally what others in the group like and dislike; they can set up an interpersonal cost-and-benefit structure among themselves that can guide all members toward the common interest. Most collective decisions are also made with relative ease.14 However, even with all the advantages of close personal contact, the family as a small group often fails to achieve the common interest. Although all family members may be encouraged to “go their own way” up to a point, some individuals may take this too far. They may fail to contribute their share to the common goal and may cause bitterness and, perhaps, the demise of the family. Given the frequent failure of the family as a viable organization
13 For a very interesting historical investigation of the cattle business during the late nineteenth century, see Rodgers Taylor Dennen, “From Common to Private Property: The Enclosure of the Open Range,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1975.14 See, for more discussion on the economics of the family, Richard B. McKenzie and Gordon Tullock, “Marriage, Divorce, and the Family,” in The New World of Economics (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1978), chap. 8
with a common interest,15 the failure of much larger groups to achieve their expressed common objectives is not difficult to understand.
Large Groups
In a large-group setting, the problems of having individual members contribute toward the development of the common interest are potentially much greater. The direct, personal interface which is present in small groups is usually lacking in larger groups; and, by the nature of large groups and the public good they produce, the benefits generated by any one person are generally spread over a large number of people, so much so that their actions have a significant effect on anyone, even themselves. As a result, they may perceive neither direct benefits in terms of what their behavior does for themselves, personally, nor indirect benefits in terms of what their behavior contributes to the welfare of others.
On the other hand, an individual may be able to detect benefits from his actions, but he must weigh these benefits against the costs he may have to incur to achieve them. For a large group the costs of providing detectable benefits can be substantial—or they can escalate with the size of the group. This is not only because there are more people to be served by the public good,16 but also because large groups are normally organized to provide public goods that are rather expensive to begin with. Police protection, national defense, and schools are examples of very costly public goods provided by large groups. If all people contribute to the public good, the cost to any one person can be slight; but the question confronting the individual is how much he will have to contribute to make his actions detectable, given what all the others do.
In the context of a very large group, suppose there are certain common national objectives to which we can all subscribe, such as a specific charitable program. It is, in other words, in our “common interest” to promote this program. Will people be willing to voluntarily contribute to the federal treasury for the purpose of achieving this goal? Certainly some people will (as Harry does in Figure 5.1 with a marginal cost of MC2), but many people may not. As they do each April 15 (the deadline for filing tax returns), most will contribute as little income tax as possible. Under a system of voluntary contributions, some people will contribute nothing. A person may reason that although he agrees with the national objective, or common interest, his contribution—that which he can justify—will do little to achieve it. He can also reason that withholding his contribution will have no detectable effect on the scope and effectiveness of the program. (If you or your parents did not pay taxes, would the level of public goods that benefit you
15 Approximately one-third of all families based on the institution of marriage end in divorce. Many others fail, in terms of the presence of intense hostility, even though there is no legal recognition of that fact.16 For a pure public good, the costs, by definition, do not rise with a few additional members. However, most groups provide services that are less than a pure public good. Education is an example of an impure public good; all education does not benefit all members of society simultaneously and to the same degree. Under these circumstances, the costs can rise, as we have suggested, with the membership, although by a lower percentage.
be materially affected?) It is for this reason that compulsory taxes are necessary. Olson writes:
Almost any government is economically beneficial to its citizens, in that the law and order it provides is a prerequisite to all civilized economic activity. But despite the force of patriotism, the appeal of the national ideology, the bond of a common culture, and the indispensability of the system of law and order no major state in modern history has been able to support itself through voluntary dues or contributions. Philanthropic contributions are not even a significant source of revenues for most countries. Taxes, compulsory payments by definition, are needed. Indeed, as the old saying indicates, their necessity is as certain as death itself.17
The general tenor of the argument also applies to contributions that go to CARE, a voluntary charitable organization interested mainly in improving the diets of impoverished people around the world. Many of the students reading these pages have been disturbed by scenes of undernourished and malnourished children shown in television commercials for CARE. All those who are disturbed would probably like to see something done for these children. They have had an opportunity to make a contribution, but how many people ever actually contribute so much has a dollar? Needless to say, many do give. They are like Harry in Figure 5.2, who is willing to dig, voluntarily, some of the weeds from his yard. On the other hand, we emphasize the point that a large number of people who have been concerned never make a contribution. (It would be an interesting classroom experiment to see how many students are disturbed by the CARE commercials and how many have ever given to the organization.) There are many reasons for people not giving, and we do not mean to understate the importance of these reasons; we mean only to emphasize that the large-group problem is one significant reason.
True, if all members of a large group make a small contribution toward the common interest, whatever it is, there may be sizable benefits to all within the group. But, again, the problem that must be overcome is the potential lack of individual incentives form which he collective behavior must emerge. Through appropriate organization of group members, the common interest may be achieved, even if the membership is large. This, however, merely shifts our attention to the problem of developing that organization. The organization of a large group can be construed as a public good, and there are likely to be costs to making the organization workable. This is likely for two reasons: first, there are a large number of people to organize, which means that even if there is no resistance on the part of the people to be organized, there will be costs associated with getting them together or having them work at the same time for the same objectives. Second, some individuals may try to “free-ride” on the efforts of others, which means it will cost more to get people to become members of the group. Further, each free rider implies a greater burden on the active members of the group. If everyone waits for “the other guy to take the initiative,” the group may never be organized. It is because of the organization costs
17 Olson, Logic of Collective Action, p. 13
that students complain so often about the instructional quality of the faculty or some other aspect of university life without doing anything about it. This is also why most people who are disgruntled with the two major political parties do not form a party with those who share their views. The probability of getting sufficient support is frequently very low, which is another way of saying the expected costs are high.
Because an organization may appear to be an obvious way to promote the public good, individuals who try to organize people for that purpose may go through a learning experience before they conclude that it is too costly a venture for them. Even if the organization is successful, the success may be temporary. Eventually, the free-rider problem emerges and the group may fall apart. During the winter of 1973-74, the United States was in the midst of an “energy crisis.” Prices of gasoline and other fuels were being held down in spite of the limited imports of fuel coming into the country from the Middle Eeast. Truckers were having a difficult item obtaining adequate supplies of diesel fuel and of passing their higher operating costs through to the buyers of truck services. Independent truckers sensed that it was in their common interest (not the public’s, of course,) to halt their deliveries of goods and services and, in that way, put pressure on the authorities to increase rates and to allocate more fuel supplies for the use of truckers. The call for cooperation met with some success; some truckers did terminate operations and some caught headlines by blocking traffic on major highways. However, there were many unwilling to go along with the work stoppage—something that was in their common interest. Consequently, the supporters of the work stoppage resorted to violence, and it was the threat of violence, and not the common interest, which kept many truckers off the road. If it had not been for the violence and the initial willingness of state police departments to allow truckers to flaunt the law by stopping traffic, including other truckers, it is very doubtful that the truckers would have had as much success as they did.
Qualifications to the Economic Theory
Obviously, there are many cases in which people acting in what may appear to be rather large groups try to accomplish things that are in the common interest of the membership. The League of Women Voters during the mid-1970s pushed hard for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. To the Constitution; labor unions work for wage increases; and the American Medial Association does lobby for legislation that is in the common interest of a large number of doctors. Churches, the Blood Mobile, and other charitable groups are able to work fairly effectively for the “public interest,” and several of the possible explanations for this observed behavior force us to step outside the scope of the public goods theory.
Why may people work for the “public interest”? First, as Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth century philosopher, said they should, people can place value on the act itself as distinguished from the results or consequences of the act. The act of making a charitable contribution, which can be broadly defined to include picking up trash in public areas or holding the door for someone with an armful of packages, may have a value in and of itself. This is true whether the effects of the act are detectable to the individual making he charitable contribution or not. The personal satisfaction (or value)
that comes form the act itself is probably the dominant reason why some people do give to CARE. To the extent people behave in this way, the public good theory loses force. Notice, however, that Olson, in formulating his argument, focused on rational economic man as opposed to moral man, envisioned by Kant. We expect that as the group becomes larger, greater effort will be made to instill people with the belief that the act itself is important.
Second, the contribution that a person has to make in group settings is often so slight that even though the private benefits are small, the contribution to the common interest is also small and can be a rational policy course. This may explain, for example, student membership in groups like the National Association of Student Teachers. All one has to do in many situations like this one is show up at an occasional meeting and make a small dues payment. Further, the private benefits of being with others at the meetings and finding out what the plans are for the association can be sufficient incentive to motivate limited action that is in the common interest.
Third, all may not equally share the benefits received by group members from promotion of the common interest. One or more persons may receive a sizable portion of the total benefits and, accordingly, be willing to provide the public good, at least up to some limit. Many businessmen are willing to participate in local politics or to support advertising campaigns to promote their community as a recreational area. Although a restaurant owner may believe the entire community will benefit economically from an influx of tourists, he is surely aware that a share of these benefits will accrue to himself. Businessmen may also support such community efforts because of implied threats of being socially ostracized.
Fourth, large organizations can be broken down into smaller groups. Because of the personal contact with the smaller units, the common interest of the unit can be realized. In promoting the interest of the small unit to which they belong, people can promote the common interest of the large group. The League of Women Voters is broken down into small community clubs that promote interests common to other League clubs around the country. The Lions Club collectively promotes programs to prevent blindness and to help the blind; they do this through a highly decentralized organizational structure. Political parties are structured in such a way that the local precinct units “get out the votes.” The surest way for a presidential contender to lose an election is to fail to have a “grass-roots” (meaning small-group) organization. Churches are organized into congregations, and each congregation is decentralized further into circles and fellowship groups. Most of the work in the Congress is done in committees and subcommittees. Quiet often a multiplicity of small groups is actually responsible for what may appear to be the activity of a large groups. The decentralization that is so prevalent among voluntary groups tends to support the economic view of groups18
18 Admittedly, other explanations for decentralization can be made, one of which relates to diseconomies of scale. That is, the organization just becomes technically less efficient as its size is expanded. The economic theory of groups rests on the motivational aspect of large organizations, rather than on the technical capabilities of the organization.
Fifth, large groups may be viable because the group organizers sell their members a service and use the profits from sales to promote projects that are in the common interest of the group. The Sierra Club, which is in the forefront of the environmental movement, is a rather large group that has members in every part of North America. The group receives voluntary contributions from members and nonmembers alike to research and lobby for environmental issues. However, it also sells a number of publications and offers a variety of environmentally related tours for its members. From these activities, it secures substantial resources to promote the common interest of its membership. The American Economics Association has several thousand members. However, most economists do not belong to the AEA for what they can do for it. They join primarily to receive its journal and to be able to tell others that they belong—both, private benefits. (The AEA also provides economists with information on employment opportunities.)
Sixth, the basic argument for any group is that people can accomplish more through groups than they can through independent action. This means that there are potential benefits to be reaped (or, some may say, “skimmed off”) by anyone who is willing to bear the cost of developing and maintaining the organization. A business firm is fundamentally a group of workers and stockholders interested in producing a good (a public good, to them). They have a common interest in seeing a good produced which will sell. The entrepreneur is essentially a person who organizes a group of people into a production unit; he overcomes all the problems associated with trying to get a large number of people to work in their common interest by providing workers with private benefits -- that is, he pays them for their contribution to the production of the good. The entrepreneur-manager can be viewed as a person who is responsible for reducing any tendency of workers to avoid their responsibilities to the large-group firm. Because it is in their interest to eliminate shirking, the workers may be just as interested as stockholders in having and paying someone to perform this task.19 An individual worker may be delighted if he is allowed to remain idle while no one else is, but he will want to avoid the risks of all workers shirking. If all shirk, nothing will be sold, the firm will collapse, and workers will lose their wages. We may, therefore, expect that even in communist societies, managers will be paid handsomely (relatively speaking) for the tasks they perform. It is interesting to note that the wage differential between workers and managers is greater in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States.

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